00100	.SEC THE PARANOID MODE
00200	.SS The Concept of Paranoia
00300		Like   ourselves,  the  ancient  Greeks  called  one  another
00400	paranoid. The term `paranoia' (Gr.:para=beside; nous =  mind)  was  a
00500	lay  rather than a medical term which referred to states of craziness
00600	and mental deterioration. For two thousand years  the  term  did  not
00700	appear  in the classification schemes of mental disorders. (Menninger
00800	et al.) Historians do  not  seem  curious  about  what  persons  with
00900	persecutory delusions were called all that time. (It is doubtful that
01000	there weren't any.) In the 18th century the term reappears in  German
01100	classifications  to  refer to delusional states which were considered
01200	disorders of intellect rather than emotion. (Lewis ).
01300		Little agreement about the term's usuage  was  reached  until
01400	the  present  time  when  it  has  achieved  adjectival  status as in
01500	"paranoid personality" and "paranoid state". Currently  the  term  is
01600	used  to  refer  to  the  presence  of persecutory delusions. Somatic
01700	erotic, grandeur and jealousy delusions are simply identified as such
01800	without calling them paranoid.
01900	
02000	.SS Characteristics of Clinical Paranoias
02100		In dividing the world of experience into conceptual classes ,
02200	we also sort and group  objects  and  events  together  according  to
02300	properties  they  have in common. The members of a class resemble one
02400	another in sharing  certain  properties.    The  resemblance  between
02500	members  of  a  class is not exact or total.  Members of a conceptual
02600	class are considered more or less alike and there  exist  degrees  of
02700	resemblance.  Humans  are  neither subjective nor objective, they are
02800	projective.   In forming classifications we project our interests and
02900	intentions  onto  the world. Thus the world of experience consists of
03000	relations, not of objects isolated from human intentions.
03100		Observations and classifications made by clinicians regarding
03200	paranoia  have  been  thoroughly   described   in   the   psychiatric
03300	literature.  Extensive  accounts can be found in Swanson, Bohnert and
03400	Smith (1970) and in Cameron (1967).    I  shall  attempt  to  give  a
03500	condensed description of paranoid phenomena as they appear in, or are
03600	described by, patients in a psychiatric interview.
03700	
03800		The phenomena the model attempts to explain can be  described
03900	under  concepts  of suspiciousness, self-reference, hypersensitivity,
04000	fearfulness , hostility and rigidity - these properties  representing
04100	empirical indicators of paranoia.                   
04200	
04300	.F Suspiciousness
04400		The  main  characteristic  of  the  clinical  paranoid   mode
04500	consists of suspiciousness of others which derives from the patient's
04600	malevolence beliefs.      The  patient  believes  others,  known  and
04700	unknown,  have  evil intentions towards him. He is continously on the
04800	look-out for signs of malevolence which he often reads from  his  own
04900	probings.  He is hypervigilant; people must be watched, their schemes
05000	unmasked and foiled.  He is  convinced  others  try  to  bring  about
05100	undesirable  states  in  himself  such  as  humiliation,  harassment,
05200	subjugation, injury and even death.  In an interview  he  may  report
05300	such beliefs directly or ,if he is guarded , they will only be hinted
05400	at.  He does not confide easily. Disclosure may depend upon  how  the
05500	interviewer  responds  in  the  dialogue  to  reports  of fluctuating
05600	suspicions or of absolute convictions of malevolence.
05700		He  is  greatly concerned with "evidence". No room is allowed
05800	for mistakes, ambiguities or chance  happenings.  "Paranoids  have  a
05900	greater  passion  for  the  truth  than  other  madmen  " -(Bellow in
06000	Sammler's Planet).  Using trivial evidential details, he  leaps  from
06100	the undeniable to the unbelievable.
06200		The patient may vary in his own estimate of the  strength  of
06300	his  malevolence  beliefs. If they consist of weakly-held suspicions,
06400	he may have moments of reasoning with himself in which  he  tries  to
06500	reject  them as ill-founded.  But when the beliefs represent absolute
06600	convictions, he does not  struggle  to  dismiss  them.   They  become
06700	pre-conditions for countering actions against tormentors who wish and
06800	try to do him evil.  He seeks affirmation of his beliefs, sympathy  ,
06900	and  allies  in  positions of power such as clinicians or lawyers who
07000	can help him take action. "It is certain that my conviction increases
07100	the moment another soul will believe in it." -(Conrad in Lord Jim).
07200		The conceptual content of the malevolence beliefs may involve
07300	a  specific other person or a conspiracy of others such as the Mafia,
07400	the FBI, Communists, Hell's Angels.  The patient sees  himself  as  a
07500	victim  ,one  who  suffers  at  the hands of others rather than as an
07600	agent who brings the suffering on himself.  Other agents subject  him
07700	to and make him the object of their evil intentions. He dwells on and
07800	rehearses in his mind these outrages. He schemes to defeat or  escape
07900	his  adversaries.   The misdeeds of others are denounced, desparaged,
08000	condemned and belittled. He feels interfered with  and  discriminated
08100	against.   At  times  the  conceptual  content of the beliefs are not
08200	directly  expressed  in  an  interview.    The  patient  may  be   so
08300	mistrustful of how their disclosure might be used against him that he
08400	cautiously feels his way through an  interview  offering  only  hints
08500	which the clinician then uses to infer the presence of delusions.
08600	
08700		Using his own judgements about the truth-status of beliefs, a
08800	clinician  attempts  to  determine  whether  the  malevolence beliefs
08900	expressed are true or false. This diagnosis is usually not  difficult
09000	in clinical settings. Occasionally malevolence beliefs turn out to be
09100	true.  Others are true but have derived from the paranoid's  tendency
09200	to  accuse and provoke others to the point where they in fact display
09300	hostility towards him.
09400	
09500	
09600	.F Self-Reference and Hypersensitivity
09700	
09800	
09900		The patient believes many more events in the world pertain to
10000	himself  in  a  negative way than seems justified to other observers.
10100	For example, he is convinced that newspaper  headlines  are  directed
10200	personally  at him or that the statements of radio announcers contain
10300	special messages for him. In his hypervigilance  he  hypersensitively
10400	reads  himself  into  situations  which  are not actually intended to
10500	pertain to him and his particular concerns.       The  references  to
10600	the  self are usually interpreted as malevolent.               He may
10700	believe he is being observed and mysteriously  influenced  by  others
10800	with  evil  intentions. He is excessively concerned about eyes (which
10900	can both watch and punish), cameras, telescopes ,etc.  which  may  be
11000	directed his way.
11100	
11200		References to the self are misconstrued as slurs, slights  or
11300	unfair  judgements.    He may feel he is being watched, stared at and
11400	even mysteriously influenced. He is hypersensitive to criticism.   In
11500	crowds  he  believes he is intentionally bumped and on the highway he
11600	feels repeatedly tail-gaited. Badgered and bombarded  without  relief
11700	by  this  stream of wrongs , he becomes hyperirritable, querulous and
11800	guarrelsome.
11900		He is touchy about certain topics, flaring up when references
12000	to particular conceptual domains appear in the  conversation.     For
12100	example,  any  remarks about his age, religion, or family, or sexlife
12200	may set him off.   Even when these domains are touched  upon  without
12300	reference  to  him, e.g. religion in general, he takes it personally.
12400	When a delusional complex is present, linguistic  terms  far  removed
12500	from,  but still connectable to, the complex, stir him up. Thus, to a
12600	man holding beliefs that the Mafia intend to harm him, a remark about
12700	Italy might lead him to react in a suspicious or fearful manner.
12800	
12900	.F Affect-States   
13000	
13100		The major affects expressed, both verbally  and  nonverbally,
13200	are  those of fear and anger.  The patient may be fearful of physical
13300	attack and injury even to the point of death.  He fears  that  others
13400	wish to subjugate and control him.  His fear is justified in his mind
13500	by the many physical threats he detects  in  the  conduct  of  others
13600	towards  him.   He is hostile to what are interpreted as insinuations
13700	or demeaning allusions. His chronic irritability  becomes  punctuated
13800	with  outbursts of raging tirades and diatribes.  When he feels he is
13900	being overwhelmed he may erupt and in desperation  physically  attack
14000	others.
14100		The experienced and expressed affects of fear and anger blend
14200	with one another  in  varying  proportions  to  yield  an  unpleasant
14300	negative  affect  state  made  continuous by fantasied rehearsals and
14400	retellings of past  wrongs.    Depending  on  his  interpretation  of
14500	malevolent  input,  the  patient  may  move away from others in being
14600	guarded, secretive and evasive and then may suddenly jump  at  others
14700	with  sarcastic  accusations  and  arguments.       His affect-states
14800	become chained into loops with those others in  his  life  space  who
14900	take  censoring action towards him because of his uncommunicativeness
15000	or outbursts.
15100	
15200		As will be described, the affects of  shame  and  humiliation
15300	are  postulated  to  play  a  crucial  role  in the operations of the
15400	paranoid mode.     One  of  the  assumptions  of  the  theory  to  be
15500	presented  involves  a principle of escaping humiliation to prevent a
15600	further reduction in self-esteem through re-experienced humiliation.
15700	
15800	.F Rigidity
15900	
16000		Among the chief properties of  clinically  observed  paranoia
16100	are  those  phenomena  which  may  be  characterized as indicators of
16200	rigidity.  The patient's beliefs in his sensitive areas remain fixed,
16300	difficult  to  influence  by  evidence  or  persuasion.   The patient
16400	himself makes few verification attempts which  might  disconfirm  his
16500	convictions.    To  change  a  belief  is  to admit being wrong.   To
16600	forgive others also opens a crack in the wall of righteousness.    He
16700	does  not  apologize nor accept apology.  He stubbornly follows rules
16800	to the letter and his  literal  interpretations  of  regulations  can
16900	drive  others  wild.   It  is  this stance or posture of rigidity and
17000	inflexibility   which   makes   the   treatment   of   paranoia    by
17100	symbolic-semantic methods so difficult.
17200	
17300	.SS Theories of Paranoia
17400	
17500		While  paranoid  processes  represent  a  disorder  from  one
17600	standpoint, the observable regularities  of  the  disorder  imply  an
17700	underlying   nonrandom   "pathological"   order   at  another  level.
17800	Attempts to explain, to  make  intelligible,  the  order  behind  the
17900	disorder,   have  been  offered  since  antiquity.    None  of  these
18000	verbally-stated formulations have won the consensus characteristic of
18100	scientific  theories since they were neither systematic nor testable.
18200		Science  represents  a  search  for  consensible   knowledge,
18300	judgements  about  which  agreement  can be obtained under particular
18400	requirements.  The major requirements for a theory to reach consensus
18500	involve systemicity and testability.
18600		For a theory to be systematic, its  hypotheses  must  cohere,
18700	not  be  isolated,  connect  with  one  another  and collaborate in a
18800	consistent way. Each hypothesis stands as an initial assumption or as
18900	a  consequence  of  one or more initial assumptions.  The consequence
19000	relation can be one  of  logical  or  empirical  entailment  but  the
19100	system, to be consistent, cannot contain contradictions.
19200		For a theory to be testable, it must be sensitive to
19300	empirical data which can strenghten or weaken its acceptability. Each
19400	hypothesis  in  the  theory  need  not  be  directly or independently
19500	testable.   But the theory as a conjunction  of  hypotheses  must  be
19600	brought  into contact with data of observation, if not directly, then
19700	indirectly, through a translation  in  which  a  consequence  of  the
19800	theory can be compared with observational evidence.
19900		Previous theories of paranoia are to be  criticized  for  not
20000	satisfying  these  requirements  of systemicity and testability.  The
20100	model to be presented fulfills these requirements. When theories  are
20200	presented  in  literary  form  it  is  difficult  to  know  what such
20300	formulations imply or whether the implications are  consistent.  They
20400	do  not  tell us what we are supposed to do in order to replicate the
20500	experience of their authors.   If a formulation  is  untestable,  the
20600	issues  it  raises  are  undecidable  and  unsettleable and consensus
20700	cannot be reached.
20800	
20900		Theories  stem from two sources, from hypotheses suggested by
21000	new descriptions (revisualizations) of the phenomena  themselves  and
21100	from  modifications  of  a legacy of previous theories serving as the
21200	bequeathed  myths  of  the  field.  Each  generation   develops   new
21300	explanatory  theories  by  discovering  new phenomena or by modifying
21400	predecessor theories.  The old theories are  unsatisfactory  or  only
21500	partially satisfactory because they are found to contain anomalies or
21600	contradictions which must be removed. Sometimes previous theories are
21700	viewed  as  lacking evidential support by current standards. Theories
21800	are mainly superseded rather than disproved.   The new  versions  try
21900	to  remove  the  contradictions  and  increase  comprehensiveness  by
22000	explaining more phenomena.
22100		Theories  have  many  functions.   They  can be summarized as
22200	follows ( Bunge) .V
22300		(1)To systematize knowledge.
22400		(2)To explain facts by showing how they are the entailed
22500			consequences of the systematizing hypotheses.
22600		(3)To increase knowledge by deriving new facts.
22700		(4)To enhance the testability of hypotheses by connecting
22800			them to observations.
22900		(5)To guide research by:
23000			(a) posing fruitful problems
23100			(b) suggesting new data to gather
23200			(c) opening new lines of investigation
23300		(6)To map a portion of reality. .END
23400		It is a tall order for a  theory  to  fulfill  all  of  these
23500	functions.  In undeveloped fields we should be happy with even one of
23600	them.    Models  can  be  assigned  these  functions  when  they  are
23700	theoretical  in  type.    Our  model  was intended primarily to serve
23800	functions (2) and (4), testable explanation.
23900		Theories  offered  as  scientific  explanations should be (a)
24000	systematic	(i.e.  coherent and consistent) and  (b)  empirically
24100	testable. Prior psychological formulations about the paranoid mode do
24200	not meet these criteria and thus are deservedly bygone  notions.  For
24300	example,  to  account  for  paranoid  thought  process  by  citing an
24400	imbalance of intellect and affect or defective role-taking is  to  be
24500	so  global  and  untestable  as  to  not merit theory status. To gain
24600	consensus with an explanation of the right type we need  a  structure
24700	of symbol-manipulating processes, strategies, functions or procedures
24800	which is capable of producing  the  observable  regularities  of  the
24900	paranoid mode.
25000		In psychiatry it is still useful to view  some  things  which
25100	happen  to a man in mechanical terms. But a man is not only a passive
25200	recipient, subject to Newtons's laws, he is also an active  agent,  a
25300	language  user  who  thereby  can  monitor  himself, control himself,
25400	direct himself, comment on and criticize these performances.   Modern
25500	psychiatric  theory should try to offer an account of man as agent as
25600	well as recipient and come to grips with  those  enigmatic  cases  in
25700	which what happens to a man can be a consequence of what he has done.
25800		Let us  consider  some  psychological  explanations  for  the
25900	paranoid  mode  beginning  in the late 19th century.  (Historians can
26000	certainly find notions of intentions, affects and beliefs as far back
26100	as  Aristotle,  who  seldom  quoted his sources.   "Its all been said
26200	before but you have to say it again because  nobody  listens"(Gide)).
26300	In 1896 Freud [ ] proposed a formulation which postulated a defensive
26400	strategy or procedure to explain persecutory paranoia .   He  assumed
26500	the believed persecution of the self by others to represent projected
26600	self-reproaches for childhood masturbation.     Today  hardly  anyone
26700	finds  this  explanation  plausible.  While it has withered, however,
26800	the concepts of defense and projection have weathered the years.
26900		Around  the  turn of the century, Fliess (according to Jones[
27000	]) proposed in letters to Freud that paranoid thought stemmed from an
27100	unconscious   homosexual   conflict.      Freud  embraced  this  idea
27200	whole-heartedly  and  in  1910  [  ]  developed  it   in   terms   of
27300	transformations  being  applied  to  the basic proposition `I (a man)
27400	love him.' He postulated this proposition to be so intolerable as not
27500	to   be   admitted   to  consciousness  and  therefore  subjected  to
27600	unconscious transformations, first into `I do not love him, I hate
27700	him'  which  in  turn  was  transformed into the conscious belief `He
27800	hates me' with the accompanying conclusion `Therefore I am  justified
27900	in hating him'.  Great difficulty has been encountered in testing the
28000	theory since there is no agreed-on method for detecting the  presence
28100	of   unconscious   homosexual  conflict.   The  explanation  is  also
28200	inconsistent with another of  Freud's  ideas  that  everyone  harbors
28300	unconscious  homosexual conflicts. But not everyone becomes paranoid.
28400	To reconcile the inconsistency  one  would  have  to  postulate  some
28500	additional,  possibly  quantitative factors, to explain the intensity
28600	and  extent  of  the  paranoid  mode  in  certain  people.    Another
28700	difficulty  is  the  fact  that  overtly  homosexual  people  can  be
28800	paranoid, requiring in such cases a postulate of some other  type  of
28900	underlying conflict.
29000		Because   of   its   inconsistency   and   untestability  the
29100	homosexual-conflict explanation has not achieved consensus.   But  as
29200	will be discussed, it may contain a grain of truth as a limiting case
29300	for a more general hypotheses regarding humiliation in  the  paranoid
29400	mode.  Freud's  later attempts at the explanation of paranoia (In Ego
29500	and Id) assumed simply that love was transformed  into  hate.    This
29600	notion is too vague and incomplete an articulation to qualify for a	
29700	contemporary explanation which reqires a more complex  and  precisely
29800	defined   organization   of   functions   to   account   for  such  a
29900	transformation.
30000		Likewise Cameron's explanation (1967) of "projected hostilty"
30100	represents  a  single,  isolated  hypothesis  lacking systemicity and
30200	insufficiently complex to match the complexity of paranoid phenomena.
30300		Tomkins    [    ]    in   1963       offered   an   arresting
30400	information-processing theory of the paranoid posture articulated  in
30500	terms     of     defensive     strategies,    transformations    ,and
30600	maximizing-minimizing principles. He viewed the paranoid "posture" or
30700	mode  as  an  attempt  to  cope  with humiliation. He proposed that a
30800	person whose information processing is monopolized  by  the  paranoid
30900	mode  is  in  a  permanent state of vigilance, trying to maximize the
31000	detection of insult and to minimize humiliation.
31100		Regarding the paranoid, Tomkins stated:
31200	.V
31300		"The major source of distortion in his interpretation is
31400		 in his insistence on processing all information as though 
31500		 it were relevant only to the possibility of humiliation."
31600	.END
31700		In 1970 Swanson et al.[ ] in a book on paranoia portrayed how
31800	a  `homeostatic'  individual  attempts  to  deal  with   `bewildering
31900	perceptions'.     They   postulated  that  a  person  in  homeostatic
32000	equilibrium perceives a pronounced inner or  outer  change  which  is
32100	inexplicable  or  unacceptable.   The  resultant disequilibrium is so
32200	bewildering  that  in  order  to  restore  equilibrium,  the   person
32300	constructs  a  paranoid explanation which attributes the cause of the
32400	change, not to the self, but to an external source.  With  the  cause
32500	of  the change identified , bewilderment is abolished and uncertainty
32600	reduced.
32700		Elements  of  this  formulation  represent  symbol-processing
32800	strategies  particularly in cases of paranoid thinkng associated with
32900	the `pronounced changes'  of  organic  brain  damage  or  amphetamine
33000	psychosis.   These are conditions which happen to a man.  In paranoid
33100	states, reactions  or  personalities  where  no  pronounced  physical
33200	change  can  be identified ,the formulation is inadequate and must be
33300	filled out with more complex and specific processes.      
33400		In sum, the rival theories of paranoia here reviewed have not
33500	gained  widespread  acceptance  because  of  various  weaknesses  and
33600	limitations.  No reigning and unified theory of  paranoia  is  widely
33700	accepted today. In such a pre-consensus state, the field is wide open
33800	for contenders. Previous theories have contributed useful hypotheses.
33900	Some  of  them  will  be  incorporated  in  a  new attempt to explain
34000	paranoid  phenomen  in  a  different  way,  using  the  strategy   of
34100	simulation.  I  shall  attempt  to  to  explain sequences of paranoid
34200	symbolic behavior (conversational interactions) by describing in some
34300	detail  a  simulation of paranoid interview behavior , having in mind
34400	an audience of mental health professionals and colleagues  in  fields
34500	of  psychiatry,  psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics and
34600	philosophy.  The  simulation  model  proposed   (Colby,   Weber   and
34700	Hilf,1971)  stands  as  a  candidate  explanation intended to be more
34800	explicit, systematic,  consistent  and  testable  than  the  theories
34900	described  above.      The  model  combines  hypotheses  of  previous
35000	formulations  e.g.Tomkins'  hypotheses  regarding  humiliation,  with
35100	hypotheses  and  assumptions  of  my  own,  into  a coherent, unified
35200	explanatory system. Let us next consider the  nature  of  explanatory
35300	systems.